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Francesco De Pellegrini, Antonio Massaro, Leonardo Goratti, and Rachid El-Azouzi?
Abstract—The surge of mobile data traffic forces network
operators to cope with capacity shortage. The deployment of
small cells in 5G networks is meant to reduce latency, backhaul
traffic and increase radio access capacity. In this context, mobile
edge computing technology will be used to manage dedicated
cache space in the radio access network. Thus, mobile network
operators will be able to provision OTT content providers with
new caching services to enhance the quality of experience of their
customers on the move.
In turn, the cache memory in the mobile edge network will
become a shared resource. Hence, we study a competitive caching
scheme where contents are stored at given price set by the mobile
network operator.
We first formulate a resource allocation problem for a tagged
content provider seeking to minimize the expected missed cache
rate. The optimal caching policy is derived accounting for
popularity and availability of contents, the spatial distribution
of small cells, and the caching strategies of competing content
providers. It is showed to induce a specific order on contents to
be cached based on their popularity and availability.
Next, we study a game among content providers in the form
of a generalized Kelly mechanism with bounded strategy sets
and heterogeneous players. Existence and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium are proved. Finally, extensive numerical results
validate and characterize the performance of the model.
Index Terms—Mobile Edge Computing, Caching, Convex Op-
timization, Kelly Mechanism, Nash Equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent boom of mobile data traffic is causing unprece-
dented stress over mobile networks. In fact, the global figures
for such traffic reached 3.7 exabytes per month at the end
of 2015. They are ascribed mostly to over-the-top (OTT)
video content providers (CP) such as Vimeo, YouTube and
NetFlix. Forecasts predict that the world’s mobile data traffic
will reach 30.6 monthly exabytes by 2020, of which 75% will
be video [1].
As a consequence, capacity shortage has become a real
threat for mobile network operators (MNOs). Solutions involv-
ing the deployment of small cell (SC) base stations [2] have
been receiving large consensus from industry and academia for
next 5G systems. SCs are low power secondary base stations
with limited coverage, to which user equipments (UEs) in
radio range can connect, hence increasing spatial reuse and
network capacity.
However, SCs are connected to a mobile operator’s core
network via backhaul technologies such as, e.g., DSL, Ethernet
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or flexible millimeter-wave links. In order to avoid potential
bottlenecks over the backhaul connection to SCs, mobile edge
caching solutions have been devised. Actually, the primary
goal of mobile edge caching is precisely to circumvent the
limited backhaul connection of SCs [3] and ensure fast adap-
tation to radio link conditions.
From the network management standpoint, in order to
handle a large number of SCs and associated memory caches,
MNOs will rely on the emerging mobile edge computing
(MEC) [4] 5G technology. MEC platforms are designed to
enable services to run inside the mobile Radio Access Network
(RAN) increasing proximity to mobile users, drastically reduc-
ing round trip time and thus improving the user experience.
Ultimately, CPs will be able to leverage on the MEC caching
service offered by 5G MNOs. Contents can be replicated
directly on lightweight server facilities embedded in the radio
access network in proximity of SCs. In this context, the design
of effective mobile edge caching policies requires to factor in
popularity, number of contents, cache memory size as well
as spatial density of small cells to which UEs may associate
to. Indeed, due to storage limitations, allocation of contents
on mobile edge caches has become an important optimization
problem [5]–[11].
In this paper, we consider a scheme in which CPs can
reserve mobile edge cache memory from a MNO. The MNO
will provide a multi-tenant environment where contents can
be stored at given price and will assign the available caching
resources to different OTT content providers. In turn, this
engenders competition of CPs for cache utilization.
First, we study the single CP optimization problem: under
a given spatial distribution of SCs, the CP decides the optimal
cache memory share to be reserved to different classes of
contents. This permits to identify the minimum missed cache
rate as a function of the purchased memory. Also, the opti-
mal caching policy defines an order among contents jointly
determined by two attributes: by the demand rate, i.e., the
contents’ popularity, and by the concurrent effect of contents
with similar popularity, i.e., the contents’ availability.
Finally, the competition among CPs is formulated using a
new generalized Kelly mechanism with bounded strategy set.
CPs trade off the cost for caching contents in the radio access
network versus the expected missed cache rate. We show that
the game admits a Nash equilibrium, and we prove that it is
unique. Further properties of the game, including convergence
and the revenue of the MNO, are investigated numerically.
The manuscript is organized as follows. In Sec. II we pro-
vide the related work and we outline the main contributions.
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Sec. III introduces the mathematical model developed through-
out the paper. In Sec. IV the optimal content caching strategy
is devised and in Sec. V we obtain the key characterization of
the optimal missed cache rate. Sec. VI provides the analysis
of the caching game. Numerical validation is performed in
Sec. VII. Finally, Sec. VIII provides closing remarks.
II. RELATED WORKS AND MAIN CONTRIBUTION
In [5] the authors consider a device-to-device (D2D) net-
work and derive throughput scaling laws under cache coding
and spatial reuse. Content delay is optimized in [12] by per-
forming joint routing and caching, whereas in [6] a distributed
matching scheme based on the deferred acceptance algorithm
provides association of users and SC base stations based on
latency figures. Similarly to our model, in [7] SC base stations
are distributed according to a Poisson point process. Contents
to be cached minimize a cost which depends on the expected
number of missed cache hits.
In [8] a model for caching contents over a D2D network
is proposed. A convex optimization problem is obtained and
solved using a dual optimization algorithm. In our formulation
we have obtained closed form solutions and properties of the
optimal cost function.
In [9] a coded caching strategy is developed to optimize
contents’ placement based on SC association patterns. In
[13] a Stackelberg game is investigated to study a caching
system consisting of a content provider and multiple network
providers. In that model, the content providers lease their
videos to the network providers to gain profit and network
providers aim to save the backhaul costs by caching pop-
ular videos. In [10] the authors model a wireless content
distribution system where contents are replicated at multiple
access points – depending on popularity – so as to maximally
create network-coding opportunities during delivery. Finally,
[11] proposes proactive caching in order to take advantage of
contents’ popularity. The scheme we develop in this work can
also be applied to proactive caching.
Since content demand patterns are typically not known
apriori, practical caching algorithms perform local content
replacement policies [14], [15]. Those rule how contents are
replaced when the cache memory is full: heuristics including
replacing least frequently used contents (LFU), last recently
used contents (LRU) and several other variants have been
proposed in literature. In our development we assume perfect
knowledge of contents’ popularity, namely, the demand rates:
recent results [15] show that by online estimation of the
contents’ popularity, it is possible to achieve optimality, i.e., to
minimize the missed cache rate. We leave the online estimation
of the contents’ demand rates as part of future works.
Main results. The main contributions obtained in this work are
the following:
• a model is introduced which accounts for the contents’
characteristics, the spatial distribution of small cells, the
price for cache memory reservation and the effect of
competing content providers under multi-tenancy;
TABLE I
MAIN NOTATION USED THROUGHOUT THE PAPER
Symbol Meaning
M number of content classes
Λ intensity, i.e., spatial density of small-cells
C set of content providers, |C| = C
r covering radius of UEs
N storage capacity of a local edge cache unit (number of
caching slots)
N0 total storage capacity of the deployment
Nic number of contents of class i for content provider c
gic popularity, i.e., demand rate for contents of class i of content
provider c
Λic availability, i.e., Λ
i
c := Λpir
2N/Nic
bc caching rate of content provider c, bc ∈ [0, Bc]
b total caching rate b =
∑
c∈C
bc
b−c =
∑
v 6=c
bv total caching rate of competing content providers;
δ mobile network provider’s own caching rate
uc caching policy for content provider c, uc =
(u1c, . . . , u
M
c ),
∑
uic = 1
xc share of cache memory occupied by content provider c
xic share of cache memory for i-th class contents of content
provider c
Bc maximum caching rate for content provider c
λc price per caching slot for content provider c
• using such model, by convex optimization, the optimal
caching policy is found to possess a waterfilling-type of
structure which induces an ordering of contents depend-
ing on contents’ popularity and availability;
• a competitive game is formulated where the price for
cache memory reservation is fixed by the network
provider. It is proved to be a new type of Kelly mecha-
nism with bounded strategy set and it is showed to admit
a unique Nash equilibrium.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this work is the first
one to study mobile edge caching under a competitive scheme.
This appears a crucial aspect in order to define new business
models of 5G MNOs for the emerging MEC technology.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us consider a MNO serving a set C of content providers,
where |C| = C. Each CP c serves his customers leveraging the
MNO network.
Contents served to the customers of a tagged CP c belong
to M different popularity classes, based on their demand rate
or popularity gic. The i-th popularity class thus features N
i
c
contents and gic content requests per day. Thus, we follow
a multi-level popularity model similar to the one proposed
in [10], [16]. In such model, files are divided into different
popularity classes, and files within each class are equally
popular.
We assume that each SC is attached to a local edge
caching server, briefly cache. Multiple caches are aggregated
by connecting them through the MNO backhaul and managed
using a local MEC orchestrator, thus forming a seamless local
edge cache unit as in Fig. 1. N caching slots represent the
available memory on such local edge cache unit; the total
cache space across the whole deployment is hence N0 = K ·N
where K is the number of local edge cache units. For the
sake of simplicity, each content is assumed to occupy one
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caching slot; since we assume N0, N  1, we rely on fluid
approximations to describe the dynamics of cache occupation.
Fetching a non cached content from the remote CP server
beyond the backhaul comes at unitary cost; such cost may
represent the content’s access delay or the throughput to fetch
the content from the remote server. Conversely, such cost is
negligible if the user associates to a small cell storing a cached
copy of the content. However, such cache should be reached
by connecting to a SC within the UE radio range r > 0. SCs
are distributed according to a spatial Poisson point process
with intensity Λ.
The following assumptions characterize the caching process:
i. each CP c can purchase edge-caching service from the MNO
and issue bc caching slot requests per day; we call bc the
caching rate, where 0 ≤ bc ≤ Bc;
ii. MNO will reserve δ > 0 caching slots per day for her own
purposes;
iii. reserved slots expire after 1/η days for η > 0;
iv. in order to attain bc caching slots per day, CP c bids b˜ ∈
[0, 1], and the MNO grants bc = b0 b˜ caching slots per day,
where b0 is such that
∑
bc + δ ≤ N0. In our analysis we
assume b0 = 1 for the sake of simplicity1.
v. CPs are charged based on the caching rate bc;
vi. demand rates gic per content class are uniform across the
MNO’s network.
The MNO will thus accommodate Xc memory slots for CP
c according to
X˙c = bc − η Xc, (1)
so that the whole cache memory occupation will be ruled by
X˙ = b− η X, (2)
where b :=
∑
c bc + δ is the total caching rate. The corre-
sponding dynamics for the fraction of reserved cache memory,
assuming X(0) = 0 is
x(t) = min
{
1,
b
N0η
(
1− e−ηt)}
The MNO, in order to ensure full memory utilization, will
choose η such that b/(N0η) ≥ 1. It follows from a simple
calculation that in steady state, the fraction of the caching
space for content provider c is
xc(t) =
bc
bc + b−c + δ
(3)
Because contents’ requests are uniform across the MNO’s
network, same fraction of cache space is occupied by CP c
in each local edge cache unit.
In particular, CP c will split his reserved memory among
content classes according to a proportional share alloca-
tion with weighting coefficients uic, i = 1, . . . ,M , where∑M
i=1 u
i
c = 1. We define uc := (u
1
c , . . . , u
M
c ) the caching
policy of CP c.
1We refer to [17] for an in depth discussion of the connection between
mechanisms and fair share of resources of the type studied in this paper.
Fig. 1. Local edge cache unit providing N memory slots.
Then, the fraction of local edge cache memory occupied by
contents of class i from content provider c is
xic =
bc∑
v∈C bv + δ
uic (4)
Finally, a tagged content of class i of content provider c is
found in the memory of a local edge cache with probability
P ic = min{ NNic x
i
c, 1}. In the rest of the paper, we will assume
N < N ic for the sake of simplicity.
Now, we want to quantify the probability for a given
requested content not to be found in the local edge cache
memory, i.e., the missed cache probability.
Under the Poisson assumption, the probability for a tagged
UE not to find any SC within a distance r is e−pir
2Λ. Applying
a thinning argument, the probability not to find a content of
class i of CP c within distance r is e−pir
2ΛP ic .
The expected missed cache rate (MCR) is thus
Uc(bc, b−c,uc) =
∑
i
gic e
−pir2Λ N
Nic
bc
bc+b−c+δu
i
c (5)
It depends on caching rate bc and on caching policy uc.
Also, b−c :=
∑
v 6=c bv accounts for the fact that other content
providers share the same cache space. In the next section we
shall describe the optimal caching policy u∗c attained when CP
c aims at minimizing (5), for a fixed value bc of the caching
rate.
IV. OPTIMAL CACHING POLICY
In order to analyse the model introduced before, we need
to characterize the CPs’ response to competitors’ actions, i.e.,
b−c. Hence, we assume that each CP aims at minimizing
his own MCR, and that the network provider guarantees full
information to CPs, i.e., storage capacity, spatial density of
SCs and total caching rate. We defer the study of the system
under partial information at the content provider’s side to later
works.
We hence consider the following resources allocation prob-
lem for the single CP:
Definition 1 (Optimal Caching Policy). Given opponents’
strategy profile b−c = (b1, . . . , bc−1, bc+1, . . . , bC) the opti-
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mal caching policy of c ∈ C is the solution of
u∗c := arg min
u1c,...,u
M
c
Uc(bc, b−c,uc) (6)
subject to the following constraints:
uic ≥ 0,
∑
i
uic = 1 (7)
It is immediate to observe that Uc(bc, b−c,uc) is a strictly
convex function in the single content provider control uc, so
that a unique solution exists [18]. In order to solve for the
constrained minimization problem in equations (6) and (7) we
can write the Lagrangian for player c ∈ C as follows
Lc(uc, µ, ν) =
∑
i
gice
−Λic bcb+δuic−
∑
i
µiu
i
c+ν
(∑
i
uic − 1
)
For notation’s sake, we have defined Λic := pir
2 Λf
N
Nci
; we
define this quantity availability. Furthermore, since constraints
are affine, the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions provide
the solution of the original problem [18].
Hereafter, we enlist the KKT conditions:
∇uLc(uc, µ, ν) = 0 stationarity
uic ≥ 0 primal feasibility: control∑
i
uic − 1 = 0 primal feasibility: normalization
µi ≥ 0 dual feasibility: control
ν ≥ 0 dual feasibility: normalization
µiu
i
c = 0 complementarity slackness
Using a standard argument [18], by complementary slack-
ness, uic > 0 implies µi = 0; let us define index set
I := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} |uic > 0}.
A. Popularity sorted case
Let us discuss a simplified setting where popularity is the
main driver for the CPs. Let us first assume that the indexes are
sorted according to contents’ popularity grc , i.e., g
1
c ≥ . . . ≥
gMc . We also assume N
1
c ≤ . . . ≤ NMc : more popular contents
are also less abundant. This assumption will be relaxed in the
next section, where we derive the general solution; we will
see that there exists a natural order combining popularity and
availability of contents which determines whether a content
class is cached or not.
In the case at hand, the structure of the optimal allocation
follows from
Lemma 1. Let grc ≥ gr+1c and Nrc ≤ Nr+1c for r = 1, . . . ,M ,
then u∗rc = 0 implies u
∗r+1
c = 0
From the previous statement we can deduce the following
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Lemma. 1 there exists
1 ≤ r0 ≤ M such that response u∗ic > 0 for i ≤ r0 and
u∗ic = 0 otherwise
The stationarity conditions can be used in order to determine
the optimal content allocation in closed form. Let 0 ≤ i ≤ r0,
then µi = µr0 = 0, so that
Λr0c g
r0
c e
−Λr0c bcb+δu∗r0c = Λicg
i
ce
−Λic bcb+δu∗ic
and
u∗ic =
Λr0c
Λic
u∗r0c −
b+ δ
Λicbc
log
(gr0c Λr0c
gic Λ
i
c
)
Finally, due to the constraint saturation
u∗r0c =
1 + b+δbc
∑r0
i=0
1
Λic
log
(
gr0c Λ
r0
c
gic Λ
i
c
)
∑r0
i=0
Λ
r0
c
Λic
(8)
From Corol. 1, the optimal solution corresponds to the max-
imal r0 such that the corresponding u∗r0c solving (8) lies in
[0, 1].
We hence observe that when Λic = Λ
j
c for all i, j, i.e., when
availability is same for all classes, the optimal caching policy
depends on contents’ popularity only. The smaller the request
rate gic, i.e., the less popular the content class, the smaller the
cache share reserved to contents of that class. Such optimal
policy is analogous to the optimal content replacement MIN
algorithm [19]. In fact, MIN, assumes full information about
the future, replaces first contents which will be requested
farthest in the future.
B. General solution
The solution to the KKT conditions can be formulated
as a waterfilling-like solution [18]. In fact, from stationarity
conditions, µr writes as
∂uicLc = −Λic
bc
b+ δ
gice
−Λic bcb+δuic − µi + ν = 0
µi = ν − Λic
bc
b+ δ
gice
−Λic bcb+δuic
which can be specialized into the following two cases.
Case i: ν > Λicg
i
c
bc
b+δ . In this case µi > 0 for any u
i
c ≥ 0.
Hence, by complementary slackness, uic = 0.
Case ii: ν ≤ Λicgic bcb+δ . It is always possible to find uic > 0
satisfying the stationarity condition and a µi that satisfies the
complementary slackness condition: just set µi = 0 and
uic =
b+ δ
Λicbc
log
(
Λicg
i
c
ν
bc
b+ δ
)
Finally, let αi := b+δΛicgicbc . For notation’s sake, the solution
writes
u∗c
i =
{
b+δ
Λicbc
(log(1/ν)− log(αi)) if 1/ν > αi
0 if 1/ν ≤ αi
(9)
subject to:
∑
i
u∗c
i = 1
It is immediate to recognize a waterfilling solution in
logarithmic scale. Let α = mini αi. Indeed
∑
i u
∗
c
i is strictly
increasing in 1/ν, 1/ν > α. Also,
∑
i u
∗
c
i(1/ν) = 0 for
1/ν ≤ α, and lim1/ν→∞
∑
i u
∗
c
i(1/ν) =∞. Thus, there exists
a unique positive ν satisfying our problem.
4
Actually, the solution is determined in polynomial time
O(M): let [·] be the permutation of the indexes which sorts
αi in increasing order, i.e., α[i] ≤ α[i+1]. For every choice
α[i] ≤ 1/ν ≤ α[i+1], one can determine a value of ν
log(1/ν) =
bc
bc+b−c+δ
+
∑k
r=1
logα[r]
Λ
[r]
c∑k
r=1
1
Λ
[r]
c
for k = 1, . . . ,M . Then, consider the only 1/ν, compatible
with (9). We observe that α[i] ≤ α[i+1] is equivalent to state
that g[i]c Λ
[i]
c ≥ g[i+1]c Λ[i+1]c : clearly, if u[i]c = 0, indeed u[i+1]c =
0, so that we can generalize Prop. 1 as follows
Corollary 2 (Threshold structure). There exists 1 ≤ r0 ≤ M
such that u∗c
[s] > 0 for s ≤ r0 and u∗c [s] = 0 otherwise.
Remark 1 (Contents’ Order). The existence of a threshold
structure in a waterfilling-type of solution is not surprising;
what we learn instead is that the natural order which deter-
mines which content classes are cached or not is given by the
values gic · Λic. Hence, the index sorting [·] which orders the
content classes with decreasing gic · Λic is the order by which
a content provider prioritizes content classes to be cached as
the cache memory available increases.
In the rest of the paper we assume content classes sorted
according to [·].
V. OPTIMAL MISSED CACHE RATE
CPs who optimize contents to be cached, for a given value
of bc, minimize the expected MCR Uc(bc, b−c,uc) in the
caching policy uc. In the game model presented in the next
section we shall leverage on the convexity properties of the
optimized MCR Uc : R2+ → R, defined as
U(bc, b−c) := min
uc∈Π
{∑
i
gice
−Λic bcbc+b−c+δu
i
c
}
(10)
where Π = {u ∈ RM |uc ≥ 0,
∑
uic = 1}. As already proved,
the minimum in (10) is unique, hence Uc(bc, b−c) is well
defined. Hereafter we thus demonstrate its convexity in bc.
Actually, convexity can be derived for a class of functions
wider than the posynomial expression appearing in (10). We
first need the following fact, whose proof is found in the
Appendix.
Lemma 2. Let f be non increasing, with domain R+. Let
H(x) = x f(x) be convex. Then f is convex on R+.
We can now derive the general conditions for the convexity
of the optimal missed cache rate
Theorem 1. Let h : RM → R, convex and decreasing in each
variable xi for i = 1, . . . ,M , then
Uc(bc, b−c) := min
uc∈Π
h
( u1cbc
bc + b−c + δ
, . . . ,
uMc bc
bc + b−c + δ
)
is convex and decreasing in bc.
Proof: In order to prove convexity for Uc, we consider
perspective function H(t,x) = t · h(x/t): H is known to
be convex if h is convex [18, pp.89]. In the next step, let
a = b−c + δ, and consider the function
min
(u1c,...,u
M
c )
{
H(bc + a, b · uc)
∣∣∣∑uic = 1, uic ≥ 0}
= (bc + a) · min
(u1c,...,u
M
c )
{
h
(bc · uc
bc + a
) ∣∣∣∑uic = 1, uic ≥ 0}
= (bc + a)Uc((bc + a)− a, b−c) = (bc + a) Ûc(bc + a, b−c)
which is convex since it is obtained by minimizing H(bc +
a,x) over the simplex
∑
xi = bc which is a convex set. Now
using Lemma 1, we conclude that Ûc(bc + a, b−c) is convex
in the first variable, and by affinity so does Uc(bc, b−c).
In order to prove the monotonicity of Uc(bc, b−c) in bc, let
us consider bc ≥ 0 and bc+ for some  > 0 and the respective
optimal caching policy u∗c(bc) and u
∗
c(bc + ). We write
h
(
u∗c(bc)
bc
bc + b−c + δ
)
> h
(
u∗c(bc)
bc + 
bc + + b−c + δ
)
> h
(
u∗c(bc + )
bc + 
bc + + b−c + δ
)
where the first inequality follows from monotonicity and the
second from optimality.
The case in (10) satisfies the assumptions by letting h(x) =∑
i g
i
ce
−Λic xi .
For presentation’s sake, in Sec. VI we shall identify
U(bc, b−c,u∗c) := U(bc, b−c). There, we also need the fol-
lowing result, whose proof is found in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 (Limit solution for bc → 0). There exists ε > 0
such that, for any bc < ε, u∗c = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and the optimal
MCR is
Uc(bc, b−c,u∗c) = g
1
ce
−Λ1c bcbc+b−c+δ +
∑
i>1
gic (11)
A. The case M = 2
For two classes of contents, M = 2, the expression for
Uc(bc, b−c) can be derived in simple closed form. This sample
case retains the main properties of the optimal policy and it
is useful in order to provide insight into the structure of the
optimal MCR. First, we write the expression of the optimal
MCR
Uc(bc, b−c) = min
0≤u1c≤bc
g1ce
−Λ1c
bc u
1
c
bc+b−c+δ + g2ce
−Λ2c
bc(1−u1c)
bc+b−c+δ
(12)
For the sake of notation, we denote Γ := g
2
cΛ
2
c
g1cΛ
1
c
. The (uncon-
strained) minimum of the right hand term is attained at
u∗1c =
Λ2c
Λ1c + Λ
2
c
− (bc + b−c + δ)
bc(Λ1c + Λ
2
c)
log(Γ) (13)
When u∗1c ∈ (0, 1), the utility function of c ∈ C is
Uc(bc, b−c) = Kc e
− Λ
1
cΛ
2
c
Λ1c+Λ
2
c
bc
bc+b−c+δ
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where the constant appearing on the first term is
Kc = g
1
c · Γ
Λ1c
Λ1c+Λ
2
c + g2c · Γ
− Λ
2
c
Λ1c+Λ
2
c (14)
Incidentally, the convexity of Uc(·, b−c) for M = 2 can be
verified directly from the convexity of exp(1/x) and by com-
position with an affine function, which preserves convexity.
We are interested in characterizing precisely the behavior of
the expected MCR as a function of bc. In particular, we want
to assess the influence of the system parameters.
Now, we can obtain the following result
Proposition 1. i. Assume Γ < 1. Let Λ1c > log(1/Γ), and
define threshold for content 2
b?c = (b−c + δ)
log(1/Γ)
Λ1c − log(1/Γ)
(15)
then it holds
Uc(bc, b−c) =
g1ce
−Λ1c bcbc+b−c+δ + g2c if 0 ≤ bc < b?c
Kc e
− Λ
1
cΛ
2
c
Λ1c+Λ
2
c
bc
bc+b−c+δ if bc ≥ b?c
(16)
where the corresponding optimal cache policy is (1, 0) in the
first case, (u∗1c , 1− u∗1c) in the second case and constant Kc
as in (14)
ii. Let Λ1c ≤ log(1/Γ), then (1, 0) case holds for any bc > 0
with associated expected MCR defined as in case i.
iii. If Γ > 1, both i. and ii. hold with role of content 1 and 2
reversed.
The proof follows by inspection of (13) considering u∗1c as
an unconstrained minimizer. First, we observe that if Γ < 1,
then u∗1c > 0, i.e., the first content class is always cached. The
other conditions follow by imposing u∗1c ≥ 1.
Discussion: availability, popularity and competition
Hereafter we draw insight from Prop. 1. First, as seen there,
the optimal caching rate u∗1c depends solely on a few system
parameters, namely gic and Λ
i
c for i = 1, 2. Actually, when
Γ < 1 then u1c
∗
= 1− u2c∗ > 0: contents of type 1 are always
cached because g2cΛ
2
c < g
1
cΛ
1
c . The fact that contents of type
2 are cached depends on the sign of Λ1c − log(1/Γ), which in
turn determines the actual structure of the waterfilling solution.
From Prop. 1, Γ < 1 means that contents of type 2 are either
less popular (g2c ≤ g1c ) and/or less available (Λ2c ≤ Λ1c) than
contents of type 1. The availability Λ1c of contents of type 1
determines whether they will be eventually cached. In practice,
when Λ1c > log(1/Γ), there exists a critical value of the CP
caching rate bc, i.e., the threshold (15). Above such value,
contents of type 2 are cached, below that they are not cached.
For the sake of consistency, in the case when Λ1c ≤ log(1/Γ),
b? = +∞ while for Γ > 1, b? = 0.
Furthermore, b?c increases linearly with both the MNO
caching rate δ and the competitors’ aggregate caching rate
b−c: competition for edge caching resources tends to prevent
caching of contents with smaller product gicΛ
i
c. Actually, under
higher competition figures, optimal caching policies are of the
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Fig. 2. Case M = 2: (a) Increasing value of b?c as a function of Γ, for
Λ1c = 1, 2, 3 and u−c = δ = 1 (b) Region of switch on of content 2.
type u1c
∗
= 1, and u∗2c = 0. It is interesting to observe that, as
detailed in case ii., not always there exists a caching rate bc
such that it is worth caching the least profitable content class.
We have provided a pictorial representation of the results
of this section in Fig. 2 for the case M = 2. In Fig. 2(a)
the value of Λ1c has been fixed at different values and the
corresponding behavior of the threshold value b?c has been
reported as a function of Γ. For exp(Λ1c) ≤ 1/Γ, it holds
b?c = ∞ since there is no switch-on value of bc for class
2. Fig. 2(b) represents the region where the switch-on of the
less popular content is possible as it can be derived from the
expression (15) as a function of 1/Γ and Λ1c .
VI. GAME MODEL FOR CONTENT PROVIDERS
So far the caching rate bc has been input for the CPs in order
to decide how to optimize the caching policy uc. Let MNO
propose to CPs costs λc per caching slot. CP c strategy in turn
is the number bc of caching slots he reserves per day, with
convex and compact strategy set [0, Bc]. The best response b∗c
of CP c depends on his contents, and his opponents’ strategies.
It is the minimizer of the cost function Uc(bc, b−c,uc)+λc ·bc:
it solves
min
bc
Uc(bc, b−c,uc) + λc · bc (17)
0 ≤ bc ≤ Bc
Here b−c =
∑
v 6=c b−v and opponents’ strategy profile writes
b = (b1, . . . , bc−1, bc+1, . . . , bC).
The uc appearing in (17) is a general caching policy and
we shall consider two cases.
Caching Rate Optimizers. In this case, the best response
of content providers is decided for a fixed caching pol-
icy uc. I.e., each content provider decides beforehand the
caching policy uc for any given caching rate bc. Let
Vc(xc) =
∑
i gc e
−Λicxc : it is convex and decreasing and
Uc(bc, b−c,uc) = Vc(bc/(
∑
bc + δ)). Hence, if all players
are caching rate optimizers, the game is a variant of the
Kelly mechanism [20]. The basic Kelly mechanism allocates a
divisible resource among players proportionally to the players’
bids, in our case the equivalent required caching rates. Here,
compared to the standard formulations in literature [20]–[23]
our formulation combines three specific features which render
it non standard:
• bounded compact and convex strategy set;
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• δ > 0 is equivalent to a bidding reservation, as described
in [23];
• prices may depend on the player, i.e., the game is a
generalized Kelly mechanism [20]
We denote the Kelly mechanism in the form outlined above
a generalized Kelly mechanism with reservation and bounded
strategy set.
Simultaneous Optimizers. In this case uc = u∗c . When
players are simultaneous optimizers, the structure of the game
still resembles the Kelly mechanism [22]. For M = 1, the
game corresponds to the case of caching rate optimizers. For
M ≥ 2, the fact that the game is actually a Kelly mechanism
is proved formally in the following
Lemma 4 (Kelly form for Simultaneous Optimizers). If play-
ers are simultaneous optimizers, the game (17) is a generalized
Kelly mechanism with reservation and bounded strategy set.
The proof of the above result is found in the Appendix.
Here, it is sufficient to observe that even in the case of a
simultaneous optimizer CP c, the optimal MCR can be ex-
pressed as Uc(bc, b−c) = Uc(bc, b−c,u∗c) = Vc(bc/(
∑
bc+δ))
where Vc(xc) is convex and continuously differentiable in
xc =
bc∑
bc+δ
.
A. Existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium
In the general case, the game may comprise a mixture
of both CPs who are caching rate optimizers and who are
simultaneous optimizers. From the above discussion, the game
is still a generalized Kelly mechanism with reservation and
bounded strategy set.
In order to characterize the possible equilibria, we describe
first the best response b∗c of each player
Lemma 5 (Best response). Given the opponent CPs’ strategy
profile b−c:
i. It holds b∗c = 0 if and only if U˙(0, b−c) > −λc where
U˙(0, b−c) =
−
∑
i g
i
cΛ
i
cu
i
c
b−c+δ
caching rate optimizers
− g1cΛ1cb−c+δ simultaneous optimizers
ii. Let b∗c > 0, then b
∗
c = min{bc, Bc}, where
U˙c(bc, b−c) = −λc.
The above statement follows from the fact that the objective
function in (17) is convex and thus has a unique minimum in
[0, Bc]. The expression of U˙(0, b−c) in the case of simultane-
ous optimizers is derived from the expression (11) reported in
Lemma 1.
The zero b∗ = 0 and the saturated b∗ = B Nash equilibria
are easily characterized in the following
Proposition 1 (Trivial Nash Equilibria). i. b∗ = 0 is the
unique Nash equilibrium iff g1cΛ
1
c < λcδ if c is a simultaneous
optimizer and
∑
gicΛ
i
c < λcδ if c is a caching rate optimizer.
ii. b∗ = B is the unique Nash equilibrium if and only if it
holds U˙c(Bc,
∑
Bc + δ) > −λc for all c ∈ C.
We observe that in the original Kelly mechanism, the
strategy vector 0 is never a Nash equilibrium [21], [22].
In our case, it may be the Nash equilibrium and this is
the effect of the term δ > 0 due the MNO’s usage of the
cache. In fact, the physical interpretation is provided by the
condition i. in Prop. 1. No CP has incentive to start caching at
give price when the marginal revenue for starting caching, i.e.,
represented by the product of demand and availability, does
not exceed the value of the cache share reserved to the MNO
operations, the term λcδ. Conversely, at low prices a saturated
Nash equilibrium b∗ = B is expected.
In the general case, the presence of a bounded strategy
set requires a specific proof for the uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium, as seen in the following.
Theorem 2 (Existence and Uniqueness). The game has a Nash
equilibrium and it is unique.
We describe a brief outline of the full proof of the above
result which is found in the Appendix. In order to prove the
existence of Nash equilibria of the game, it is sufficient to
observe that:
• the multistrategy set is a convex compact subset of RC ;
• Uc(bc, b−c,uc) is convex conditionally to the opponents
strategy, both for simultaneous optimizers and caching
rate optimizers;
Hence, the existence of Nash equilibria is a direct consequence
of the result of Rosen [24], originally formulated for n–persons
concave games. With respect to the uniqueness, b∗ = 0
and b∗ = B are always unique from Prop. 1. Once we
excluded those trivial cases, the uniqueness can be derived by
extending an argument [23] to the case of a bounded strategy
set. Such proof applies to both the case of simultaneous
optimizers and of caching-rate optimizers. However, it requires
cost functions to be continuously differentiable in bc, which
is not straightforward for simultaneous optimizers.
Finally, the proof of uniqueness applies also to the context
where part of the players are simultaneous optimizers and the
others are caching-rate optimizers.
We further observe that from the proof of Thm. 2 we can
derive a simple bisection algorithm to calculate the unique
solution of the game. It will be used in the numerical section
where we shall provide further characterization of the game
via quantitative measures, There, we are describing the pricing
operated by the MNO and the convergence to the Nash
equilibrium when CPs are myopic cost minimizers.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we provide numerical description and valida-
tion of the model.2 First we validate the models’ assumptions
against a real world scenario. Then, we focus on the single
player’s actions, having fixed the remaining players’ strategies.
Finally we provide numerical characterization of the game
2Both the Python scripts and the dataset used for validation can be down-
loaded at https://www.dropbox.com/s/mm1hja2dbp4tw0x/caching scripts.tar.
gz?dl=0.
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3-simoultaneous optimizers game. Settings are: g1 = [0.18, 0.27, 0.55], g2 = [0.3, 0.6, 0.1], g3 = [0.6, 0.1, 0.3], Λ11 = Λ
2
1 = Λ
3
1 = 0.3, Λ
1
2 = Λ
2
2 = Λ
3
2 =
0.1, Λ13 = Λ
2
3 = Λ
3
3 = 0.2 (c) detail of the corresponding restpoint; (d) revenue of the MNO for increasing uniform price. Parameters are: g1 = [0.3, 0.2, 0.5],
g2 = [0.3, 0.5, 0.2], g3 = [0.29, 0.36, 0.35], N = 70, N i1 = 600, N
i
2 = 700, N
i
3 = 500, δ = 2, r = 73m.
introduced in the previous section.
Point Process. The model introduced in Sec. III assumes that
SCs are distributed according to a spatial Poisson process
of given intensity Λ. Hence, we have tested the perfor-
mance of the optimal caching policy in the case the SCs
spatial deployment does not adhere to the assumption of
a Poisson point distribution. In order to do so, we have
been comparing the theoretical results with the outcome of
a simulation performed over a real dataset. The real dataset
(source http://opencellid.org/) is the sample distribution of
the cell towers deployed in downtown Milan over a 2 × 3
Kms area, as depicted in Fig. 3(a): it includes the location of
4717 cell towers corresponding to Λ = 786.2 base stations
per square Km. The distribution of base stations in a very
densely populated urban area has been used as a reasonable
approximation for a SC deployment.
The sample spatial density Λ has been used in the model
in order to evaluate, under the same spatial density of SCs,
the theoretical CP’s cost function for increasing values of the
covering radius 0 ≤ r ≤ 400m in the following cases (see
Fig. 3(b)): a) the CP performs a uniformly random caching
policy uic = 1/3, i = 1, 2, 3 for constant caching rate bc b)
the CP performs a popularity-based caching policy, i.e., uic :=
gic/
∑
gic, for constant bc c) the CP is a caching rate optimizer
adopting a popularity based caching policy d) the CP is a
simultaneous optimizer.
The results in Fig. 3(c) refer to a simulation encompassing
the same strategies under the sample point distribution of
Fig. 3(a). The simulation has been performed by repeatedly
selecting a random UE position in the playground, and mea-
suring the sampling frequency of missed cache events upon
requesting contents from SCs within the UE’s radio range.
By comparing the results in Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c), we
observe that the Poisson distribution – as expected due to
the non-uniform spatial density of the sample real-world
deployment – tends to slightly underestimate the cost incurred
by CPs. However, the theoretical and the simulated results are
very close and the relative performance of the caching policies
match the prediction of the theoretical model. This result
confirms that the proposed model performs well even in real
world scenarios: under a non-Poisson point process for the SC
spatial distribution a rational optimizing player would choose
the proposed optimal strategy over other possible strategies.
Cost function. In the next experiment we describe the optimal
caching policy (Fig. 3(d)) and the cost function (Fig. 4(a))
in the case M = 3. In particular, Fig. 3(d) reports on the
characteristic waterfilling structure of the optimal caching as
the parameter bc increases. As predicted by the model, the
water-filling solution has a threshold structure. The value of bc
determines the content classes that become active: for large bc
all content classes are cached, whereas for small values only
some are cached. In Fig. 4(a) we have reported the typical
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convex shape of the cost function corresponding to the same
setting and for increasing values of b−c. It is worth noting
how the actions of opponents, reflected in the value of b−c,
affect the shape of c’s cost function.
Convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c)
we have simulated 3 CPs who are simultaneous optimizers.
They behave as myopic players: each one of them, chosen
at random, optimizes his own cost function based on the
opponents’ profile. Numerical simulations show that, after
a small number of iterations the game stabilizes on the
same restpoint irrespective of initial strategies. As depicted
in Fig. 4(c) the restpoint is indeed a minimum for each
CP’s cost function, i.e., it is the Nash equilibrium of the
game. This behavior suggests that the game has the finite
improvement property [25], even though we could not identify
analytically a potential for the game. Hence, the system would
naturally converge to his unique Nash equilibrium if each
player optimizes independently its own cost function against
the opponents.
Finally, we have drawn in Fig 4(d) the daily revenue of the
MNO at the Nash equilibrium b∗ as a function of the caching
price λ, uniform for all CPs. Because the MNO’s total revenue∑
c λ · b∗c depends on the Nash equilibrium, she could try to
optimize her revenue by leveraging the CPs’ cost structure.
We observe numerically that the total revenue appears to have
a unique maximum at a certain maximizer price λ∗. This
suggests the existence of a unique Stackelberg equilibrium for
the proposed scheme. This provides the possibility to compute
the global restpoint of the system when both CPs and MNO
behave strategically.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
A model for mobile edge caching in 5G networks has
been presented. OTT content providers compete for the cache
memory made available by a MNO at given price. Several
features of the system are captured, including popularity and
availability of contents, spatial distribution of small cells,
competition for cache memory and the effect of price. CPs
can optimize the allocation of contents in order to reduce
customers’ aggregated missed cache rate. We have found that
the optimal caching policy is of waterfilling type. Also, it is
showed to give priority to contents based on popularity and
availability. We have confirmed the validity of the caching
policy optimization on real-world traces.
Finally, the competition for the shared caching memory can
be formulated as a convex n–persons game. This game is a
new form of the Kelly mechanism with bounded strategy set,
where each CP trades off the expected missed cache rate for
the price paid to the MNO in order to reserve cache memory
space. The existence and uniqueness properties of the Nash
equilibrium are demonstrated. Also, numerical results indicate
that when CPs are myopic optimizers, the system converges
to a unique restpoint which is the Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, from numerical results, this game appears to
have a unique Stackelberg equilibrium, a relevant feature for
the MNO in order to maximize her revenue at the optimal
price. To this respect, an interesting research direction is to
develop online algorithms by which the MNO can learn over
time such optimal price.
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IX. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: Let u∗c the optimal allocation, and let us assume
that u∗r+1c > 0 It is sufficient to write the generic cost as
Uc(bc, b−c,uc) =
∑
i∈I
gic e
−pir2Λ NNi
uicbc
b+δ +
∑
i 6∈I
gic
from which it is immediate to see that a response uc identical
to u∗c but where u
r
c = u
∗r+1
c and u
r+1
c = u
∗r
c is better off. In
fact we can write
∆U = Uc(bc, b−c,u∗c)− Uc(bc, b−c,uc)
= gr+1c e
−pir2Λ N
N
r+1
c
ur+1c
∗
bc
b+δ + grc − grce−pir
2Λ NNrc
ur+1c
∗
bc
b+δ − gr+1c
> gr+1c e
−pir2Λ NNrc
urc
∗bc
b+δ + grc − grce−pir
2Λ NNrc
urc
∗bc
b+δ − gr+1c
> (grc − gr+1c )
(
1− e−pir2Λ NNrc
urc
∗bc
b+δ
)
> 0
which concludes the proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 11
Proof: One only content type is cached if and only if
1 = u[1]c =
bc + u−c + δ
Λ
[1]
c
(
log(1/ν)− log(α[1])
)
log(1/ν)− log(α[i]) < 0,∀i ≥ 1 (18)
After simple calculations, the above condition brings
1/ν = e
Λ
[1]
c bc
bc+u−c+δα[1] < α[i],∀i > 1
Which can hold true if and only if the exponential term is
close enough to 1. Finally, observe that the ordering of the
αi’s does not depend on bc and that the exponential converges
to 1 for small bc, which completes the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: If we assume H and f are both twice differentiable
the proof is trivial.
In the case of non differentiable functions, we can verify the
convexity condition for f(·). In fact, for every 0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2
and t ∈ (0, 1):
f(tx1 + (1− t)x2) = H(tx1 + (1− t)x2)
tx1 + (1− t)x2 (19)
≤ tH(x1) + (1− t)H(x2)
tx1 + (1− t)x2 = g(t) (20)
Now, we observe that g(0) = f(x2) and g(1) = f(x1).
Also, we note that g is convex for t ∈ [0, 1]. In fact, g is
differentiable in t, and, by rewriting g(t) = N(t)/D(t), a
direct calculation provides
g¨(t) =
2x1x2(x2 − x1)
(
H(x1)
x1
− H(x2)x2
)
(t x1 + (1− t)x2)3 ≥ 0
where the nonnegative sign is due to assumption that f is
non-increasing. Now, by convexity, we can write
g(t) = g((1− t) · 0 + t · 1) ≤ (1− t)g(0) + tg(1)
and replacing the above expression in (19), f is seen to satisfy
the claim of convexity.
D. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: First, we have to prove that the optimal cost can be
expressed as Uc(bc, b−c) = Vc(bc/(
∑
bc + δ)) where Vc(xc)
is convex and continuously differentiable in xc = bc∑ bc+δ . In
order to do so, for a given value of b−c we denote B(b−c) =
{b?[1], . . . , b?[M ]} the set of thresholds such that, for b?[k] ≤ bc <
b?[k+1] it holds u
[1]
c , . . . , u
[k]
c > 0 and u
[k+1]
c = . . . = u
[M ]
c = 0.
Hereafter, let us simplify the notation and consider the indexes
sorted according to [·] as described in Sec. IV. From (9) and
accounting for the expression of the αs, it is immediate to see
that the number of active content classes is a function of the
type k = k
(
bc∑
bc+δ
)
. Also, for b?(k) ≤ bc < b?(k + 1), we
can calculate the closed form
U(bc, b−c) = Bk
k∏
i=1
(Λicg
i
c)
1
BkΛ
i
c e
− 1Bk
bc
bc+b−c+δ +
M∑
i=k+1
gic (21)
where Bk =
∑k
i=1
1
Λic
. Hence, by inspection, the right hand
term is a function of xc = bc∑ bc+δ .
Now, we have to prove that such function if continuously
differentiable. Since U(bc, b−c) is smooth in (b?c(k), b
?
c(k +
1)), we can restrict to the threshold points, in particular, we
consider b?k+1 and verify that equality holds for the left and
right derivative of (21). It holds
d
dbc
U(bc, b−c) = −
k∏
i=1
(Λicg
i
c)
1
BkΛ
i
c e
− 1Bk
bc
bc+b−c+δ
d
dbc
bc∑
v bv + δ
(22)
The value of threshold b? = b?(k+1) is derived by the relation
log(1/ν) = log(αk+1) which writes
b?∑
b? + b−c + δ
= −
k∑
i=1
log(αi)
Λic
+Ak log
(∑ b? + b−c + δ
Λk+1c g
k+1
c b?
)
(23)
We can now replace (23) and αi =
b?+b−c+δ
gicΛ
i
cb
? into (22) for
both the case k and k+1. A direct calculation, which we omit
for the sake of space, shows that the equality at b? is verified,
concluding the statement.
E. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 will require the result in the Lemma
reported next. The Lemma itself is a technical continuity
argument. We remark that, even in the unbounded case,
the results of uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the
Kelly mechanism [23], requires the cost function to be twice
continuously differentiable.
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Lemma 6. For each player c there exists a unique, continuous,
decreasing function xc(p) such that
d
dx
Vc(xc(p))(1− xc(p)) + pλc = 0, (24)
where Vc(x) is the function defined in the proof of Lemma 4.
Proof: Since we refer to player c, unless required for
the sake of clearness, we shall hereafter identify x := xc
for the sake of notation. First, we need to have a closer
look to the structure of the cost function. We know that
there exist n, n ≤ M − 1, intervals for bc such that in
each interval the cost function is described as in (21). Now,
let x = x(bc, b−c) = bcbc+b−c+δ . We want to characterize
x?k =
b?k
b?k+b−c+δ
. By definition, x?k is the threshold value above
which the k-th content type will start to be cached.
Now, resorting to the water-filling formulation of the opti-
mal allocation in (9), the k-th threshold is uniquely identified
by the condition{
1/ν = αk∑k−1 1
x?kΛ
i
c
(log( 1
x?kΛ
k
cg
k
c
)− log( 1x?kΛicgic )) = 1
(25)
The condition (25)
x?k =
k−1∑ 1
Λic
log
(
Λicg
i
c
Λkcg
k
c
)
(26)
It is important to observe that the x?ks do not depend on
b−c: the M critical values for x are the values x?k determined
by (26) such that x?k ≤ 1. At this point, we observe that
the thresholds in x for player c depend on c’s parameters
only, and they are naturally ordered increasing with the lag
k and. Incidentally, we observe that, since x ∈ [0, 1], it is well
possible that just some of the x?k are smaller than one, and
those that are bigger than one are not attained. In fact, this
means that some content classes may not be cached, for any
value of bc.
We can now go on with the main proof of the Lemma. In
[23] the cost function is assumed to be twice continuously
differentiable, i.e., C2. However, our cost function is only
continuously differentiable in the variable bc, i.e., C1. More
in detail, by direct inspection it is possible to verify that
that the optimal missed cache rate is C2 piecewise, with a
finite number of points where the second order derivative
is discontinuous: those correspond precisely the values x?k
discussed above.
The argument proceeds as follows. Let Uc(bc, b−c)+λc(bc)
be the cost function of a simultaneous optimizer. The best
response of the player c must fulfill the following relation:
d
dbc
U(bc, b−c) + λc = 0. (27)
Now, define
V (x) = Bk
k∏
i=1
(Λicg
i
c)
1
BkΛ
i
c e
− 1Bk x +
M∑
i=k+1
gic, x ∈]x?k, x?k+1[.
We know that V ∈ C2([0, 1] \ {x?1, ..., x?M}) ∩ C1([0, 1]).
Letting x = bcbc+b−c+δ , p = bc + b−c + δ, we can rephrase
(27) as
d
dx
V (x)(1− x) + pλc = 0, x ∈]x?k, x?k+1[. (28)
Now, in ]x?k, x
?
k+1[×R the left hand side is a C1 function
(indeed it is C∞, but C1 is sufficient for our argument),
hence we can apply the implicit function theorem and, in
the same fashion as in [23], we can derive the existence of
a continuous decreasing function x :]pk, pk+1[→]xk, xk+1[,
such that ddxV (x(p))(1 − x(p)) + pλc = 0, p ∈]pk, pk+1[.
Moreover, the monotonicity of x implies
lim
p→pk
x(p) = x?k, lim
p→pk+1
x(p) = x?k+1
We repeat the same argument on each interval ]x?k, x
?
k+1[,
and we finally glue together the x functions defined over
each interval obtaining a monotone surjective function. From
the monotonicity of V , such function is well posed since
(28) forces same values of x for same values of p. Also,
continuity and monotonicity ensure that the the domain of x is
a connected set, i.e., the interval ∪]pk, pk+1[= (0, δ+
∑
Bc).
Thus, we have defined a unique decreasing, continuous
function x(p) : [0,
∑
Bc + δ] → [0, 1] such that (x(p), p)
solves (28).
We can now prove Theorem 2.
Proof: In order to characterize the existence of Nash
equilibria of the game, it is sufficient to observe that:
• the strategy set is a convex compact subset of RC ;
• Uc(bc, b−c,uc) is convex conditionally to the opponents
strategy;
Hence, the existence of Nash equilibria is a direct consequence
of the result of Rosen [24], originally formulated for n–persons
concave games (here players minimize so convexity applies).
Let b∗ is a Nash equilibrium: b∗ = 0 and b∗ = B are always
unique from Prop. 1. Let us hence consider the remaining
possible equilibria.
Let xc(p) the function defined at (24). From Lemma 5, we
can now write the best response in x for each player as a
function of p:
xˆc(p) = max(0,min(xc(p), Bc/p)). (29)
Since all functions in the definition of xˆc(p) are decreasing
and continuous in p, so it is xˆc(p). Moreover, xˆc(0) =
1, limp→∞ xˆc(p) = 0. Now, we observe that the actual best
responses of players in a Nash equilibrium need to satisfy the
condition ∑
xˆc(p) = 1− δ
p
, p ∈
[
0,
∑
Bc + δ
]
. (30)
But condition (30) determines a unique p. In fact observe that
the sum on the left-hand side is decreasing in p, its value at
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0 is M and tends to 0 as p increases. The term on the right-
hand side is increasing in p and tends to 1 as p increases. It
follows that the two functions can be equal in no more than
one point. This implies that the Nash equilibrium is unique and
is determined by the unique p? such that the equality holds
true.
We can define C0(p) = {c ∈ C|xˆc(p) = 0}. Also, the set
CB(p) = {c ∈ C|p · xˆc(p) ≥ Bc} is unique for every value of
p ∈ [0,∑Bc). Finally, the Nash equilibrium b∗ is derived by
the bijection b = φ(p∗), where
i. φc(p∗) = 0 for c ∈ C0(p∗);
ii. φc(p∗) = Bc for c ∈ CB(p∗);
iii. the φc(p∗)s for c ∈ C′(p∗) = C\(C0(p∗)∪CB(p∗)) with the
bijection induced from the full rank compatible linear system
b∗c(1− x∗c) +
∑
v∈C′(p∗)
b∗vx
∗
v = −δx∗c − |C′(p∗)|
B2
p
, c ∈ C′(p∗)
which concludes the proof.
Remark 2. It is worth observing that we proved that unique-
ness holds despite the optimal cost function is not C2 as
required in [23]. In order to extend the argument of [23] to our
case, we had to carefully adapt the implicit function theorem
to the case of a piecewise-C1 function. The uniqueness follows
by continuity and monotonicity of the implicit function.
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